The Xi Xia state is known by a number of different names; they called themselves Mi-nyag (Mji-njaa) and Da Xia; the Chinese sources refer to them as Xi Xia which is Western Xia, and Tangut is the Mongolian form, possibly based on the ethnic name Dang with a plural ut on the end. I have been using the names Xi Xia and Tangut interchangeably as these are the two forms found most commonly in academia; but I will be using Da Xia and Tangut from now on.
The Tanguts were known in early Chinese records as Dangxiang Qiang and were noted as occupying the steppes around the Kokonur, or Qinghai Lake. In the late 7th century, the Tibetan empire forced them to migrate to the Tang, where Chinese sources describe two distinct branches of the tribe, one was relatively sedentary, the other was nomadic; they could be united by a military emergency but were otherwise stubbornly independent, and this stubbornness seems to have been a retained trait as they achieved and then preserved an integrated statehood.
The Tang allowed the Tanguts to settle in the great bend of the Huang He, the Yellow River, and gave them control over Xia Prefecture which included the northern part of Shaanxi Province and the Ordos Desert. In the late 9th century, the Tangut rulers were elevated to Dukes of Xia by the Tang, and with the collapse of that dynasty, Xia essentially became independent offering only nominal subservience to their neighbours.
During the Five Dynasties period, the group were granted the royal title King of Xiping, which translates to the King who pacifies the West; the rulers were also bestowed the Chinese surname Li. In 967 the Song emperor confirmed the title King of Xia and inadvertently cemented Tangut independence.
This independence was precarious; in addition to the military and diplomatic threats issued by the Song, from 925 onwards the Tanguts also had to deal with the highly militaristic Liao Dynasty which forced them to play an expert diplomatic game. In 980 the Tangut ruler Li Jipeng (Li Ji-pung) promised to give up the title of King of Xia and take a military governorship in the Song. He moved to the Song capital Kaifeng where he encouraged family members to join him.
This resulted in a cousin named Li Jiqian (Li Ji-Chien), spending three years carefully planning and executing a rebellion among the Tangut tribes against Li Jipeng (Li Ji-pung). Li Jiqian (Li Ji-Chien) took control of Xia and submitted the state to the Liao in 986 after the Song’s failed invasion of the Khitan dynasty. The Khitan would provide military and financial support to Li Jiqian’s (Li Ji-Chien’s) rebellion on the receipt of an annual tribute and the transfer of all Song prisoners of war from the Tanguts to northern China. The deal was sealed by the marriage of a Khitan princess to Li Jiqian, who was able to use this backing to conquer Song prefectures in northern Shaanxi. The Liao also issued Li Jiqian (Li Ji-Chien) with a patent of enfeoffment as King of Xia. Enfeoffment is a fun word which I discovered during my research, and it means that the two parties entered into a feudal agreement with the bestowment of the title. I’m not sure it properly describes the situation here – the Liao and Song both believed that Xia was a vassal state, but I’m not sure that the Tanguts saw it that way.
The Song responded to the Liao’s actions by releasing Li Jipeng (Li Ji-pung). They gave him an army, announced him as the rightful ruler of Xia prefecture and demanded that he wage war against his cousin. A “war”, in inverted commas, was waged between the two although it is difficult to judge how seriously it was fought or whether the whole shemozzle had been an elaborate ruse designed to keep the Song and Liao off the backs of the Tangut. Both men professed loyalty to their chosen superpower but their actions, their game, ensured the continued independence of the Tangut state.
It is unsurprising then that this game led to worsening trust between the three nations; the Liao flipped between offering the Tangut a carrot or a stick, whilst the actions of the Liao towards Xia further antagonised a Song state that was desperate to regain its northern territory. However, it seems to have given the Tangut space to consolidate their own territorial gains and look at expanding in the west where they would gradually captured the Hexi Corridor.
Rather coincidently, both cousins died in 1004, one died on campaign in the west, one died at the Song court, but their deaths led to the re-unification of the Tangut state under Li Deming (Li Duh-ming), the son of Li Jipeng (Li Ji-pung). He would continue to appease both Song and Liao and resisted a Khitan campaign in 1020.
Li Deming (Li Duh-ming) was succeeded In 1032 by his own son Li Yuanhao. Li Yuanhao was highly educated, a noted master of Chinese and Tibetan writing; an extremely knowledgeable student of Buddhism, and a unifying figure who had embraced both the settled and nomadic elements of Tangut society. He was a proficient horseman and archer and would implement a series of reforms which would allow him to aggressively pursue Tangut interests in the region.
These reforms included the development of a Tangut script which supplanted Chinese as the language of government; He began the process of building the Tangut law code, using the Chinese legal tradition as its foundation. He also reformed the army with the aim of turning the fairly sedentary Xia state into a professional mobile power. Men were conscripted from the age of 14 or 15, new units were created, the role of cavalry was enhanced, as was Yuanhao’s personal guard. Yuanhao also adopted a Tangut surname and ordered all men to shave their heads on the threat of death.
FW Mote states that these changes were representative of the state’s new expansionist focus; however, China was not the target, it was the west and the north. In 1036 Yuanhao annexed the Ganzhou Uyghur kingdom and occupied Dunhuang; in the north there was expansion into the Gobi Desert.
Not content with simply being King of Xia, in 1038 Yuanhao adopted some of the trappings of the Chinese imperial system, proclaimed himself emperor and claimed the Heavenly Mandate for the Tanguts. The Xia state would now be known as Da Xia, the Great Xia, and by claiming the Heavenly Mandate Yuanhao was throwing off any illusions of Tangut subservience.
The Song reaction was immediate; they closed the shared border and started military action. They had been forced to accept Khitan claims to the Heavenly Mandate, but there was no chance that this upstart vassal state would be allowed to do so. They would launch annual repeated attacks against Da Xia from 1038, which caused them huge financial and manpower losses as the reforms of Yuanhao showed their value. The Liao didn’t seem to care about the Tanguts claiming the Heavenly Mandate, because it distracted the Song from pursuing their claims to northern China. Yuanhao could call himself whatever he wanted – they didn’t have to acknowledge it and indeed would continue to invest Da Xia emperors as King of Xia instead.
By 1042 the Song had exhausted themselves and looked for peace, but instead of dealing with Yuanhao they brokered an agreement with the Liao, because they retained the mistaken assumption that the Tangut were being manipulated by the Khitan; the Liao did not correct this misassumption and happily accepted the extra tribute. The furious reaction of Yuanhao to this treaty made the Song realise their error but they were able to direct his anger to a war against the Liao in 1043. It was then the Song’s turn to invest Yuanhao as King of Xia, which they did in 1044, when they also agreed to pay the Tanguts a large annual tribute.
This settlement led the Khitan to believe that Da Xia were getting too cosy to the Song and so they declared war on the Tanguts, and the cycle of violence between the three states continued.
Yuanhao’s assassination in 1048 sparked a period in Tangut history which was marked by the elevation of extremely young emperors, powerful regents and civil war.
During the rule of Emperor Chongzong, who came to power in 1086 aged 3, the Tangut drew closer to the Liao and would continue to offer support to the Khitan right up until the dynasty had been ousted by the Jin. In 1122 a Tangut army intercepted and defeated a Jurchen force which was pursuing the last Liao emperor. This victory was short-lived with the Tangut army being defeated by the same enemy the following month; however, Chongzong’s continuing support for the Liao had important consequences. Lacking anything of material value to thank Da Xia, the final Liao emperor crowned Chongzong as the Emperor of Xia, finally giving the Tangut emperors recognition of their imperial statehood and legitimising their claims to rule by Heavenly Mandate.
The replacement of the Liao dynasty by the Jin in 1125 meant a resetting of the relationship with northern China; the Jurchen held the view that Da Xia had been a subject of the Liao and congratulated them on their loyalty, stating that if they were to show the same level of loyalty to their new masters then there would be no problems. Terms were agreed where the Tangut would take the role of subordinate state in return for the restoration of land taken from them during the Jurchen conquest of Liao; they also received land taken from the Song as the Jurchen began to push their new borders south. Chongzong took further advantage of Song weakness to invade and claim additional territory, which the Jin confirmed as Tangut land once peace was re-established.
The Jin also made it clear that there would be no return to the relationship Da Xia enjoyed with Liao, hinting that the Tangut state would eventually be absorbed into the Jurchen one; although in reality there would be too many distractions for this to ever to come to pass. Chongzong died in 1139 having reigned for 53 years. He was succeeded by his son Renzong, aged 15.
The early part of Renzong’s rule was characterised by an adoption of Chinese cultural traditions, rebellions trigged by these adoptions and natural disasters which exacerbated the social unrest. Peace returned in 1150s and 60s when the Tangut government began to resemble the Song court; this included the reintroduction of Chinese script into government affairs where it gained parity with the Tangut one.
In 1170 another crisis gripped the nation when Renzong’s uncle attempted to seize power and submit Da Xia to the Song. Renzong appealed to the Jurchen for help, but before they could do anything, the uncle got careless, the plot was revealed and Renzong was able to dispose of him and his supporters.
Despite reigning for 54 years, Renzong is described as a weak and timid ruler and his death in 1193 led to factionalism and instability. As we hit the Mongol period, it should be noted that that the instability within the state appears to have been a purely political issue rather than a social one. Everything I have read about Tangut society suggests that there was a strong national identity which was pretty resilient to factional strife and poor leadership.